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DIGNITY RIGHTS: A RESPONSE TO PEGGY
COOPER DAVIS’S “LITTLE CITIZENS AND
THEIR FAMILIES”
Jane M. Spinak*
Peggy Cooper Davis has proposed that human dignity shoulders
the burden of managing—if not resolving—the complex relationship
of the state to the family as an entity and to the individual members
of that entity, in particular the child.1 She is not alone in asking
dignity to do this hard work. Supreme Court Justice Anthony
Kennedy has placed dignity at the center of our understanding of the
state’s role in intimate relationships.2 Defining dignity is difficult,
however, and the specific “smell test” for its use that Davis proposes
reaches beyond the “histories and traditions” that have identified a
dignity right as fundamental and worthy of protection to consider two
additional circumstances.3 One is the development of international
human rights standards since the end of World War II, and the second
is to consider under what conditions the victim of an affront to their
dignity—and the rest of us—finds that affront intolerable. The
verifying source of this test is the resistance to this treatment through
counterdemonstration and reasoned protest.4 What complicates the
analysis in the family context is the competing dignity rights of the
individual members of the family and the family as an entity entitled
to its own dignitary respect.

*

Edward Ross Aranow Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I would
like to thank the organizers of the 2015 Cooper-Walsh Colloquium, Flourishing
Families in Context, for inviting me to participate in the symposium and respond to
Professor Peggy Cooper Davis’ remarks; I also thank the editors of Fordham Urban
Law Journal for their assistance in publishing this response. Finally I would like to
thank Professor Jason Parkin, who organized, and Professor Wendy Bach, who
moderated, a panel at the 2016 AALS Annual Meeting that directly led to this
response.
1. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Little Citizens and Their Families, 43 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1009, 1009, 1013–14 (2016).
2. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593–94, 2599, 2606, 2608 (2015).
3. See Davis, supra note 1, at 1010–11, 1013.
4. Id. at 1013.
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Nowhere is this complexity more clearly identified than in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the global
community’s statement of commitment to nurturing and supporting
the best interests of the child.5 Those interests are served, first and
foremost, by respecting and protecting the family:
[T]he family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural
environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and
particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection
and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within
the community . . . [and] the child, for the full and harmonious
development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family
environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and
understanding.6

After situating the child’s best interests firmly in the family, the
Convention then compels the state and its institutions to protect the
child and her family against discrimination, ensure that state action to
protect the child’s best interests be taken only after consideration of
the role of the child’s parents, and to support the economic, social,
and cultural rights of those children, as enumerated in subsequent
articles of the Convention.7 The child is not, however, only a creature
of the family or the state. Rather, the child is an emerging individual
with perspectives, ideas, interests, and beliefs, all worthy of support
and protection.8 Davis refines our conception of human dignity by
employing international human rights standards to augment the
American constitutional meaning of the term.9 She implicitly (and in
her conclusion perhaps explicitly) proposes what the CRC has already
recognized: that the tensions inherent in the “child-family-state”
triangle can be mitigated by the provision of positive obligations by
the state.10 That is, families cannot be the nurturing protective site
where children grow, thrive, and develop to their full capacities
without affirmative and sustained assistance from the state in the
many facets of the child’s life: education, health, food, and shelter at a
minimum. The “thoughtful and simultaneous respect” that Davis

5. See Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 3, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (“In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”).
6. Id. at preamble.
7. Id. arts. 2–4.
8. Id. arts. 12–16.
9. See Davis, supra note 1, at 1012.
10. Id. at 1021.
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advances to manage these tensions is,11 in many ways, a call for the
state to take an affirmative role in creating and sustaining the object
of this colloquium: flourishing families. Yet to get there requires not
only difficult conversations about supporting families, but also
renewed attention to constitutional rights to address significant and
growing inequity.
Let’s start with having the conversation. In her wonderful book,
Failure to Flourish, Clare Huntington identifies how different moral
beliefs about the state’s role in family life impact our ability to talk
across those differences to support families.12 The competing moral
systems employ strict-father and nurturing-parent metaphors to
ascertain the appropriate role of government in family life.13 In the
strict-father system, the government’s role is to promote morality,
self-discipline, and self-reliance, while in the nurturing-parent system
the state promotes fairness, self-fulfillment, and helping those in
need.14 Huntington notes these moral systems are hardened by our
tendency to discount factual information that is not consistent with
our beliefs15 and, as Davis pointed out many years ago, our tendency
not to change our minds but to maintain the status quo.16 These
moral system metaphors analogize, if imperfectly, to negative and
positive rights theories: the protection from government intervention
rather than promotion of government support.
Huntington has contributed to having conversations that bridge
such a serious divide in many ways—including identifying why it is so
hard to have the conversations17—but I want to focus on her effort to
debunk the paradigm of the autonomous family and to surface, from
what has been termed “the submerged state,” how all families get and
need state support.18 Then I want to move more front and center the
burgeoning inequality in our country that requires us to rethink our
ideas about rights and ultimately our understanding of dignity.
Huntington pinpoints how government programs assist all families,
only differently. For most majority and upper-income-families, the
11. Id. at 1014.
12. CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 207–11 (2014).
13. Id. at 208.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 209.
16. Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at
Risk: Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 139, 145–46
(1995).
17. HUNTINGTON, supra note 12, at 207–11.
18. Id. at 71–73.
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benefits the state provides respect privacy and do not come with
intrusive and demeaning requirements: home mortgage deductions,
an ability to live in school districts with better schools, and
government-backed student loans serve as examples.
Public
education is just available—Huntington calls it background noise19—
and many other programs require little more than checking a box or
filling out a form. These families do not experience the government
as messing in their lives.20 Programs that provide a safety net, such as
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), require
substantial paperwork, invasive certification interviews, regular
recertification meetings, and varied conditions of receipt beyond
financial need.21 For many minority and low-income families, instead
of friends with benefits, they get benefits with friends: a constant
stream of government officials invading and interrupting their lives.22
These families experience the state without the dignity that Davis
hopes will mediate the child-family-state tension and the supports
that Huntington hopes will make families flourish. And the assistance
they do get often exacerbates their troubles.
Poverty remains an intractable problem in the United States. In
the half-century since President Lyndon Johnson launched his War on
Poverty, the poverty rate has barely been reduced from nineteen
percent to fifteen percent with forty-six million Americans now living
in households with barely adequate income.23 During the same
period, the “great compression” of the post-World War II era that
built a political economy of the middle class, especially of white men,
and harkened the possibility of greater racial and gender equality
ended, and the distributive patterns of the Gilded Age reemerged.24
Children’s extreme poverty increased in the United States by seventyfive percent between 1995 and 2005 with fifteen million Americans
living in this deep poverty.25 This inequity is intensified by the re-

19. Id. at 72.
20. Id. at 72, 78.
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2012); Michele Estrin Gilman, Welfare, Privacy, and
Feminism, 39 U. BALT. L.F. 1, 4–6 (2008).
22. Gilman, supra note 21, at 2, 5.
23. Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 793
(2014).
24. Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94
B.U. L. REV. 669, 693–94 (2014).
25. Tahk, supra note 23, at 834.
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segregation of America’s schools.26 And the strict-father approach to
poor families has triumphed from the Clinton-era dismantling of the
welfare system to monitoring the contents of food stamp recipients’
shopping carts.27
How does this combination of factors affect Davis’s proposal of
dignity rights mediating the relationship between the family, child,
and state?
By some accounts, the possibilities look grim.
Anthropologist and legal scholar Khiara Bridges has challenged the
idea that poor families, especially those headed by women and
women of color, even have dignity rights to lose. In her ethnographic
study of women applying for the Medicaid Prenatal Care Assistance
Program (MCAP), Bridges exposes the invasive and demeaning
requirements to receive publicly financed prenatal care.28 Bridges
argues that poverty has stripped away the traditional privacy rights
enjoyed by families, exposing them to extreme scrutiny and setting
conditions in areas of their lives that have nothing to do, in this
instance, with the prenatal health of their child.29 Bridges contends
that impoverished families are denied the presumption that parents
will do their best to raise their children and the state will only
interfere when the children are at risk.30 Instead, impoverished
families’ failure to achieve economic self-sufficiency denies them that
presumption.31 In other words, since these families cannot be
presumed to raise their children well and in ways that will make them
productive citizens, they are subject to such extreme and pervasive
scrutiny when they seek government assistance that they become

26. See Nikole Hannah-Jones, Segregation Now, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 16, 2014,
11:00
PM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/segregation-now-full-text
[https://perma.cc/S5CN-RHT7].
27. See Alan Pyke, How the Conservative Obsession with Policing Poor People’s
Shopping Carts Got Started, THINKPROGRESS (May 12, 2015, 8:00 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2015/05/12/3657467/food-stamps-junk-food-banhistory/ [https://perma.cc/TT8N-47Z2].
28. See Khiara Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 113, 127–35 (2011).
29. Id. at 164–65. These rights could alternatively be framed as family autonomy
or family integrity. The Supreme Court, after reviewing the cases that established
“perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court,”
concluded: “In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of
parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000).
30. Bridges, supra note 28, at 162–64.
31. Id. at 152–53.
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“public families” without privacy rights at all. They have not lost
them by bartering for essential health care; they never had them.32
It is not that [these] patients, because of their poverty, do not have
presumptions of privacy; rather, their privacy is presumed altogether
nonexistent. So framed, it does not appear that wealth helps to buy
the presumption of privacy, but rather wealth is the condition of
possibility for privacy.33

In characterizing the non-existence of privacy rights for these
families, Bridges warns that even if rights were reformulated to be
positive obligations—rights to rather than against the government as
Davis suggests and the CRC provides—such rights would still be
meaningless for poor families.34
Are there ways around this dispiriting formulation? While
Huntington’s effort to surface the ways that the state assists all
families will help, the significant difference in the way that assistance
is structured reinforces Bridges’s point. Tax scholar Susannah Camic
Tahk has reported that tax-embedded programs engender more
bipartisan support and that the public supports tax-embedded
programs more favorably than cash assistance programs.35 The
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is the prime example. The EITC
has been rightly hailed for lifting millions of children out of poverty.36
Tahk shows, however, that when Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) was the country’s primary anti-poverty program
before Clinton’s welfare reform, AFDC filled an average of about
twenty-one percent of the poverty gap while, despite the increased
spending on EITC in the first decade of this century, the EITC only
fills about 5.4 of the poverty gap.37 And yet EITC is twice as
effective at filling the poverty gap as TANF, the current cash
assistance program.38 Critically, the EITC does not impact families in
extreme poverty because it requires income other than public
benefits, leaving these families out entirely.39 Including these families
in a tax-based structure may be the only program solution in a strictfather system because, as Tahk concludes:

32. Id. at 168–71.
33. Id. at 172.
34. Id. at 174.
35. See Tahk, supra note 23, at 822–25.
36. Id. at 801–02.
37. Id. at 802–03.
38. Id. at 803.
39. Id. Tahk recommends ways to counter this problem through improvements
on the tax-based approach to poverty. See generally id. at 837–51.
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Insofar as the non-tax war on poverty lacks political viability, the
real choice for policymakers and advocates may not be between the
tax and the non-tax war, but between the flawed tax war on poverty
and no war on poverty at all.40

Using an improved tax-based system may diminish the intrusive
nature of government assistance for families in deep poverty, even
helping to reinstate the privacy rights Bridges says have disappeared.
Yet this remains a political, not a constitutional, response to the
inequities at the heart of this inquiry. And political solutions do not
provide the same assurances as articulations and defenses of
constitutional rights.
Bridges contends that economic self-sufficiency is the basis for
securing family dignity rights. Legal scholars Joseph Fishkin and
William Forbath offer a way to reimagine securing that selfsufficiency by asking us to reconsider the very way that we
understand the Constitution. Alarmed by persistent poverty, a
shrinking middle class and a wealthy, entrenched elite, they contend
that the political-economic problem of this growing inequity is also a
constitutional problem and was understood to be so for a significant
period in our history.41 In The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution they
explore “makes demands on our economic and political order—and
that among those demands is the need to avoid oligarchy.”42 Equal
citizenship and equal opportunity cannot be achieved within an
oligarchy, and all three branches of government are responsible for
achieving those objectives.43 This understanding was lost, they argue,
as the Constitution in the second half of the twentieth century came
to mean, “the Court-enforced Constitution” where anti-oligarchical
principles have been erased.44 Nevertheless, they hope that the time
is right for renewing our historic understanding that all branches of
government share responsibility for the “nation’s constitutional
political economy” because “[e]xtreme concentrations of economic
and political power undermine equal citizenship and equal
opportunity [making] oligarchy . . . incompatible with, and a threat to,
the American constitutional scheme.”45

40. Id. at 826 (emphasis in original). Tahk recommends ways to accomplish this
goal. See generally id. at 837–51.
41. Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 24, at 670–71.
42. Id. at 673.
43. See id. at 693.
44. Id. at 692–93.
45. Id.
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Let’s tie together the various threads of this essay, circle back to
Davis’s dignity test, and apply it to a specific subject that deeply
implicates the relationship among the family, child and state: the right
to an education. As Davis outlines, the “public school cases” provide
a template for understanding Fourteenth Amendment family liberty
jurisprudence.46 The state can require children to be educated, but
parents retain some prerogative over the kind and place of that
learning. Children are the recipients of this “balance” but are not
independently entitled to pursue their own educational interests.47
The Court may have established an important principle of family
autonomy, but Davis warns that the price may have been losing “our
best collective response to class-based gaps in the quality of childhood
education—gaps that grow as they mirror and perpetuate an
expanding crisis of income disparity.”48 That collective response was
further imperiled by the Court’s decision in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which failed to hold that
children had a constitutional right to an education.49 Davis’s dignity
test, along with the lessons learned from the scholars considered
earlier, revives the possibility of securing that right to the benefit of
children, parents, and the state.
Davis’s test enhances the understanding of dignity rights in two
ways: applying human rights protections and employing collective
resistance to intolerable conditions.50 The human rights protections
that most closely align with a careful balance among the family, child,
and state are elucidated in the CRC and offer the best standard to
counter Chief Justice John Roberts’s contention that “[o]ur cases
have consistently refused to allow litigants to convert the shield
provided by constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive
entitlements from the State.”51 The Court has already used the CRC
as a shield, invoking it as a basis for prohibiting the juvenile death
penalty,52 so the possibility of using human rights standards as a
sword are less unfathomable than they were when Rodriguez was first
decided. Moreover, if we apply the test’s second prong—resistance to
intolerable conditions—the current state of inequity in our country
46. See Davis, supra note 1, at 1009.
47. See id. at 1015–19 (describing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Pierce
v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972)).
48. Id. at 1016.
49. 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
50. Davis, supra note 1, at 1012–13.
51. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2620 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
52. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005).
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demands exploring every avenue to diminish that inequity, including
revisiting our constitutional interpretation of basic rights. Brown v.
Board of Education identified the right to education within the
balancing test of family dignity by declaring:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is
required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms.53

The anti-oligarchy framework entreats us to revisit Brown’s
declaration in light of current economic conditions and resegregation.54
Resistance can be employed in a second way. Obergefell sets a
standard for dignity that recognizes “that new insights and societal
understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and
unchallenged.”55 The work that has been done to find a right to
education has taken many forms: in pursuing the right in state
constitutions, in finding new bases for re-litigating Rodriguez, in
organizing grassroots efforts to amend the Constitution, and in
congressional efforts to improve education systems or even create a
federal statutory right to education.56 These efforts help to provide
the unnoticed insights and understandings that mirror the remarkable
transformation of our understanding of intimacy rights in
relationships. Joshua Weishart, in Reconstituting the Right to

53. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
54. See Hannah-Jones, supra note 26; Patrick Wall & Monica Disare, Small
Number of Schools Enrolls Large Share of Public Housing Residents, Report Says,
CHALKBEAT (Jan. 15, 2016, 7:11 PM), http://ny.chalkbeat.org/2016/01/15/smallnumber-of-schools-enrolls-large-share-of-public-housing-residents-reportsays/#.Vp1fccCANBe [https://perma.cc/SXZ5-ETDE].
55. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.
56. Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV.
915, 918–20 (2016).
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Education, reminds us that “if there is a federal constitutional right to

education, its principal function is to protect children, and thereby,
society at large.”57 This protection is against the harms of racial
discrimination and education deprivation that will disadvantage them
in their lives as citizens and in the market economy.58 If wealth is
“the condition of possibility” of rights that Bridges alleges,59 then
children must be protected from this education deprivation or face
exile from their place in the market and in the democratic process.
When Justice Kennedy wrote that “[o]utlaw to outcast may be a step
forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty,” he
echoed Bridges’s warning that poor families now live outside the
protection of the constitutional right to dignity that Obergefell has
articulated.60 We must bring them back inside for their sake and for
ours.

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 956.
Id. at 957–58.
Bridges, supra note 28, at 172.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.

